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and determined that an "emission stand-
ard" is intended to be a quantitative limit
on emissions, not a "work practice"
standard. Unfortunately, Justice Rehn-
quist disregarded the fact that asbestos
emissions are impossible to measure
quantitatively. The history of the regula-
tion demonstrates that the work practice
standard was chosen by the Administrator
after it became clear that he could not
prohibit all visible emissions of asbestos
without destroying an entire industry.
Furthermore, while numerical standards
are preferred by Congress, the statute
contains no express requirement that
standards always be framed in numerical
terms; nor has Congress expressed an
overriding interest in using such terms
when a less drastic control technique is
available.
The majority also relied on the rule that
"where there is ambiguity in a criminal
statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the
defendant." United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336,348 (1971). But in Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S.1,16, (1965) the Court
held that "[w]hen faced with a problem of
statutory construction, this Court shows
great deference to the interpretation given
the statute by the officers or agency
charged with its administration. 'To sus-
tain the application of the statutory term
[as applied by the agency], we need not
find that its construction is the only rea-
sonable one, or even that it is the result
we would have reached had the question
arisen in the first instance in judicial pto-
ceedings.' "
Looking again to the statutory scheme,
Justice Rehnquist believed that the
Government was not relieved of its duty
to prove that the allegedly violated
regulation is an "emission standard" even
though § 307(b)(2) precludes judicial
review of the validity of emission stand-
ards. Under §307(b)(1), though, this
regulation could have been reviewed only
in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, and because of this express
language, Adamo should have been bar-
red from raising the issue before any other
court.
The majority distinguishes Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944),
where the Court held that in the context
of criminal proceedings, Congress has the
power to require that the validity of a
regulatory action be challenged in a par-
ticular court at a particular time, or not at
all. However, Justice Rehnquist views the
statutory provisions of the Emergency
Price Control Act considered under Yakus
as a "relatively simple statutory scheme"
in contrast with the Clean Air Act's "far
more complex inter-relationships between
the imposition of criminal sanctions and
judicial review of the Administrator's ac-
tions." There is nothing ambiguous,
vague or difficult in § 307(b). Its intent
that a petition for review of an action of
the Administrator in promulgating any
emission standard may be filed only in the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit could hardly
be more obvious. Congress has clearly ex-
pressed that "any review of such actions"
be controlled by the provisions of §
307(b) .4 Additionally, the Adamo opinion
fails to adequately express the alleged ine-
quities which would arise as a result of
adherence to the Act's venue require-
ments in the current "complex" situation.
The majority's interpretation of an
"emission standard" denies the Adminis-
trator the authority to effectively regulate
the emission of asbestos, a poisonous sub-
stance which poses an especially grave
threat to human health. Their interpreta-
tion of the plain statutory language of §
307(b) frustrates the intent of Congress to
establish a unified and expedient system
of judicial review under the Clean Air Act.
In the words of Justice Stewart, who dis-
sented along with Justices Brennan,
Blackmun and Stevens, "the Court today
has allowed the camel's nose into the tent,
and I fear that the rest of the camel is
almost certain to follow."





by Roxane Nass Sokolove
On January 10, 1978, the Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled that
an unwed father's substantive due process
rights were not violated by a Georgia
statute which denied him the authority to
prevent the adoption of his illegitimate
child. Nor was the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment violated
by the distinction made in the Georgia
statute between the rights of fathers of
legitimate children and the rights of
fathers of illegitimate children.
Although the unwed father may have as
great a personal interest in his child as a
married father has in his child, the unwed
father must establish that interest in law
by either marrying the mother of his
children and recognizing the offspring of
the illicit relationship, or legitimizing the
children as provided by statute. The
authority to then bar the adoption of the
children stems from this legally estab-
lished interest.
In Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S. Ct. 549
(1978), therefore, the absence of such
legal status, and the Court's application of
the "best interests of the child" standard
and recognition of the state's interest in
child rearing by a family unit were the
vehicles used to defeat the asserted con-
stitutional rights of an unwed father.
In December, 1964, a child was born
from the illicit relationship of Ardell
Williams, appellee, and Leon Webster
Quilloin, appellant. The child's mother
and natural father never married nor lived
together as a family. In September, 1967,
Ardell Williams married Randall Walcott,
appellee. The following March, Randall
Walcott, with the consent of the child's
mother, filed a petition to adopt the child.
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Prior to the time Randall Walcott filed
his petition for adoption, Leon Quilloin,
the natural father, had never attempted to
legitimize the child by marrying Ardell,
recognize the child as his and file a peti-
tion for legitimation, or obtain visitation
rights, all of which are prescribed methods
of legitimization under Ga. Code Ann. §§
74-101, 74-103. It was not until the step-
father filed the adoption petition that
Leon Quilloin, in attempting to block the
adoption tried to secure visitation rights.
It is also significant that at no time did
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Quilloin seek custody or object to the
child's continuing to live with appellees.
In opposing the adoption and attempt-
ing to gain vistation rights and legitimize
the child, Quilloin argued that Ga. Code
Ann. § 74-203, placing all parental power
in the mother of an illegitimate child, and
Ga. Code Ann. § 74-403(3), requiring
only her consent for an illegitimate child's
adoption, are unconstitutional.
The trial court, in granting Walcott's
petition for adoption and denying
Quilloin's petition for legitimation and
visitation rights, based its decision on the
"best interest of the child" standard. The
factors used in determining whether or
not the standard was met included:
1. Quilloin's failure to provide support
for the child on a regular basis;
2. Ardell's custody of the child for the
child's entire life;
3. The marriage of Randall Walcott
and Ardell Williams Walcott;
4. The disruptive effect of Quilloin's
erratic contacts with the child on both
the child and on Walcott's entire
family;
5. The child's expression of desire to
be adopted by Walcott and take on
Walcott's name.
98 S.Ct. at 552-553.
The "best interest of the child" stand-
ard has been applied in custody cases of
both legitimate and illegitimate children.
("The cardinal principle that the welfare
of the child should determine its custody
is applicable to legitimate as well as il-
legitimate children." 10 Am.Jur.2d.
Bastards § 60.) In 1879, a Michigan Court
in Corrie v. Corrie, 42 Mich. 509, 510, 4
N.W. 213, 214, declared: "neither of the
parties has any rights that can be allowed
to seriously militate against the welfare of
the child. The paramount consideration is
what is really demanded by its best in-
terests." Since that time, courts have
recognized this standard as a guideline in
exercising judicial discretion as to who
shall gain custody of a child. By way of
example, see Montgomery County v. San-
ders, 38 Md. App. 406, 407, 381 A.2d
1154, 1156 (1978).
In denying Quilloin's claim that Ga.
Code Ann §§ 74-203, 74-403(3) are un-
constitutional, the lower court concluded
that Quilloin lacked standing to object to
the adoption because he had failed to ob-
tain a court order granting legitimation
which would have authorized him to con-
test the adoption. Ga. Code Ann. §
74-103
Appealing to the Supreme Court of
Georgia, Quilloin argued that §§ 74-203,
74-403(3), as applied by the trial court to
his case, violated the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment.
Under Georgia law, the consent of both
parents, whether married or divorced, is
necessary to permit the adoption of a
legitimate child §74-703. However, as to
illegitimate children only the consent of
the unwed mother is needed. Quilloin
claimed that the exclusion of an unwed
father from the list of those whose consent
is required for adoption, is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. However,
according to the Supreme Court of
Georgia, "[TIhe Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment requires that all
persons be treated alike under similar cir-
cumstances and conditions. [However, it]
does not prevent classification if the dis-
tinction is based on valid state interests."
Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232,
S.E.2d 246, 248 (1977). Thus, the ma-
jority of the Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's decision on the
grounds of the "state's interest" in rearing
children in a family setting. Placing full
parental power in the mother evidences
the state's interest in favoring marriage
and the family because the father can
choose to join the family at any time. Ga.
Code Ann. §§74-101, 74-103; 238 Ga.
at 232, 232 S.E.2d at 248. "Accordingly,
the court placed great credence in the fact
that adoption was sought by the child's
stepfather who was a part of the family
unit in which the child was living" 46
U.S.L.W. at 4057. The valid state interest
in rearing children outweighed the exclu-
sion of an unwed father as one who must
consent to the adoption of the child.
Therefore, classification was a proper ex-
ercise by the Georgia lawmakers.
Quilloin also contended that the
Georgia statues took away his parental
rights without due process of law. He
relied upon the United States Supreme
Court decision of Stanley v. Illinois 405
APRIL, 1978 F1
, s,. oweve[, le appellant was never a
part of the family unit nor did he ever
desire to be. Conversely, the adoption by
appellee would result in legal recognition
of a family unit already in existence. In
affirming the Georgia Supreme Court, a
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court found
that the "best interest of the child" stand-
ard was met by the adoption of the child
by one who had continuously supported
the child, married the child's mother, and
was expressly requested by the child to be
its father.
The Court's rejection of appellant's
claim, that excluding an unwed father
from those entitled to veto an adoption
constitutes a denial of equal protection,
ppo O~ nZ veU U WIL1n or 18 years.
Further, had Stanley lived in Georgia,
which recognizes common law marriages,
he would have been more than a de facto
member of the family unit and the case
would never have arisen. Quilloin v.
Walcott at 238 Ga. 233-234, 232 S.E.2d
at 249. In essence, Stanley involved
deprivation and change of custody rather
than an initial award of custody as in
Quilloin.
The Georgia Supreme Court found
Stanley not controlling and §§74 203 and
74-403(3) as not having violated the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clause
of the 14th Amendment. However, a
strong dissent claimed that the majority
misconstrued Stanley v. Illinois. They said
that the Court in Stanley intended to
recognize the Due Process rights of all
fathers, not merely those who live with
their families. 238 Ga. at 234, 232 S.E.2d
at 249. Consequently, the dissent said,
"because an unwed father has due process
rights in his children, it is a denial of equal
protection to treat them differently from
other parents." Id., at 235, 232 S.E.2d at
249.
Quilloin appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1257(2) challenging the constitu
tionality of Sections 74-203 and
74-403(3) of the Georgia Code. Focusing
out accepting the responsibility of father-
hood, and the state could be required to
sever his relationship before the adoption
could proceed." Quilloin v. Walcott, 238
Ga. at 233, 232 S.E.2d at 248. The ma
jority of the Georgia Supreme Court also
recognized the danger of profit seeking by
the unwed father in having the adoptive
family secure his consent to the adoption.
The state interest in protecting the best
interests of the illegitimate child is a
further justification for the distinction be-
tween the interests of the unwed father
and those with authority under the
Georgia Code to contest the adoption.
The child's interests in this case were best
served by granting adoption by appellee
was based upon the existence of a valid and denying appellant's attempt to bar
state interest. It suggested that the dis- the action. The state's interest in protect-
tinction between the interests of an unwed ing an existing family unit providing for
father and those of an unwed mother (or the care and support of the child, is ex
of the parents of legitimate children) vis- tremely strong. Appellant's interest sur-
a-vis their right to contest an adoption, is faced only after he received notice of ap-
valid. Ga. Code Ann. §74-403(3) pellee's petition for adoption. Quilloin's
It appears that legislative intent in- failure to provide continuous support,
fluenced the Supreme Court in finding a visit regularly or legitimize the child, ver-
valid distinction. In Georgia, adoption sus appellee's continuous support of the
procedures are strictly staturory in nature. family unit provides the basis for a valid
They give little recognition to fathers of distinction which serves the best interests
illegitimate children. Georgia Code Anno- of the child and the state.
tated §74-403(3) specifically provides The Supreme Court has recognized the
that "if the child be illegitimate, the con- rights and responsibilities that attach to
sent of the mother [to adoption] shall paternity. No longer can an unwed father,
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U.S. 645 (1971). In that case an Illinois on the "disparate statutory treatment of suffice." Section 74 203 states that "thestatutory scheme, which required a hear- his case and that of a married father," he mother of an illegitimate child shall being and proof of unfitness before the state claimed he was entitled as a matter of due entitled to the possession of theassumed custody of a child of married or process and equal protection to an ab child... Being the only recognized parent,divorced parents or unmarried mothers, solute veto over adoption of his child, ab- she may exercise all the paternal [sic]
yet required no such showing before sepa- sent a finding of unfitness. The issue power." To be recognized in law as therating a child from an unwed father, was before the Court was thus whether father of an illegitimate child, one mustheld unconstitutional. The Georgia Georgia's adoption laws, by denying un- petition for legitimation or marry theSupreme Court distinguished Quilloin v. wed fathers the right to prevent adoption natural mother and recognize the child asWalcott from Stanley v. Illinois. Stanley of their illegitimate children, deprive his. Ga. Code Ann. §74-101.
was denied a hearing on his fitness as a them of due process under the 14th Public policy was a further apparentparent before his children were taken from Amendment and equal protection of the basis for the Court's decision. Otherhim merely because he had never law. courts have recognized that provisionslegitimized them. He had, however, lived The Supreme Court concluded that §§ denying unwed fathers the right to contestwith the mother of his illegitimate 74-203 and 74-403(3) did not deprive an adoption facilitates the work of thechildren and his children for almost 18 the appellant of his rights under the 14th welfare agencies in the adoption process.years before the mother died. Upon the Amendment. The "best interest of the State ex rel Lewis v. Social Services ofmother's death, the children were placed child" standard would have offended ap- Wisconsin and Upper Michigan 47 Wis.2d
with guardians. For all practical purposes, pellant's due process right only if the state 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1973) vacated andthe court, in finding the Illinois statutes had broken up a family unit of which ap- remanded on other grounds, 405 U.S.
unconstitutional was protecting a family pellant was a part, without granting ap- 1051 (1972). "If the consent of the fatherunit; Stanley and his children whom he pellant a hearing and showing his unfit were also required, he might refuse with-
who offers neither his support nor his
name, claim a right in his illegitimate
child. Rights and responsibilities of father-
hood are concomitant; an unwed father







On May 31, 1977, the Supreme Court
of the United States decided the case of
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v.
Hodory, 97 S. Ct. 1898, regarding the
asserted right of an employee furloughed
as a result of a coal strike to receive
unemployment benefits. In 1974 Leonard
Hodory was employed by United States
Steel Corporation to work in a steel mill
in Youngstown, Ohio. The United Mine
Workers went out on stirke at all coal
mines owned by United States Steel Cor-
poration (USS) and by Republic Steel
Corporation. These company-owned
mines supplied the fuel used in the opera-
tion of manufarturing facilities of USS and
Republic. As a result of the strike the fuel
supply at the Youngstown plant was
reduced. The plant eventually was shut
down and in November 1974 Hodory was
furloughed. Hodory applied to the ap-
pellant state agency for unemployment
benefits. On January 3, 1975 the ap-
pellant disallowed his claim under OHIO
REV. Code §4141.29(D)(1) (a) which pro-
vides that a worker may not receive
unemployment benefits if: "His
unemployment was due to a labor dispute
other than a lockout at any factory, estab-
lishment, or other premises located in this
or any other state and owned or operated
by the employer by which he is or was last
employed; and for so long as his
unemployment is due to such labor dis-
pute."
On January 27 Hodory filed a com-
plaint based on 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the
United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf
of himself and "all others similarly
situated" who had been or in the future
would be denied benefits under
§4141.29(D)(1)(a). The court held that
the statute as applied to Hodory entitled
him to unemployment benefits. The State
appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court of the United States and in an 8-0
decision (Mr. Justice Rehnquist not par-
ticipating) the Court reversed the District
Court.
The Supreme Court held that (1) the
abstention doctrine was not applicable in
this case; (2) the Ohio statute was neither
in conflict with, nor pre-empted by, the
Social Security Act or the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act; and (3) the
statute had a rational relation to a legiti-
mate state interest and did not violate the
Equal Protection or Due Process clauses
of the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court's decision as to the
abstention doctrine was based upon the
fact that the state voluntarily chose to
submit to a federal forum and principles of
comity do not demand that the federal
court force the case back into the State's
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